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ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF  
CANADIAN SENATORS

by

E. COLIN CAMPBELL

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF CANADIAN SENATORS submitted by Edwin Colin Campbell in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.





## ABSTRACT

This study concerns itself with Canadian Senators' orientations to two aspects of their roles as legislators. These are what have been termed their federal-representational roles (i.e. the degree to which Senators perceive themselves as protectors of the provinces and sections), and their general legislative roles (i.e. the ways in which Senators perceive themselves as legislators in a general sense and as legislators in a second chamber).

Partially in an attempt to determine these orientations this author conducted 49 personal interviews with Canadian Senators in May and June of this year (1966). The data from these interviews reveal several interesting things about Senators' role perceptions. For instance it was found that Senators tend considerably less than do M.P.s to assume "provincial" roles in the federal-representational dimensions. Also, the Senators indicated in their responses to questions on the general legislative role of the Senate that they no longer perceive the Senate as performing traditional functions (e.g. protection of conservative interests, propertied, provinces, or minorities), and tend today to see the Senate as performing purely technical functions. At the same time, it was found that although a good number of Senators indicated discontent over the present role of the Senate in Canada's legislative system a majority of Senators were quite happy with the way things are today.

In addition to the above observations several relations were found between the ways in which the Senators assumed roles under the various categories and a number of independent variables such as area of representation, party affiliation, age, regime of appointment, and previous political career.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

It is the object of this thesis to discuss in detail the way in which Canadian Senators perceive their roles as legislators. Before beginning this study it would seem appropriate to discuss briefly what is meant when we refer to a legislator's role, the general functions of second chambers, and the role of the Canadian Senate as a second chamber in Canada's parliamentary system.

#### Legislators' Roles

The observations made by John C. Wahlke in The Legislative System on the roles of legislatures seem to apply as well to legislators as they do to the legislative chambers.

Wahlke develops the view that the function of a legislative chamber is a broader thing than simply "rule-making", that is, deciding "what shall and shall not be law".<sup>1</sup> The point that Wahlke is making is equally well made by Gabriel Almond in his use of conversion functions when describing the process whereby demands entering a political system are "articulated, aggregated, or combined, converted into policies, rules, regulations; applied, enforced, adjudicated".<sup>2</sup> It would seem reasonable to assume that a legislative body within this process would occupy the largest share of

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<sup>1</sup>John C. Wahlke et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Science, World Politics, XVIII (January, 1965), p. 194. For detailed descriptions of Almond's functional structural approach to the study of political science, see the above article, and Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), Chapter 1.





its time on the general function of rule-making. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the possibility that the body and its members have other functions that spill over into other sectors of the conversion process.

In this context Wahlke provides us with what appears to be an exhaustive list of functions that legislatures and in turn legislators can perform in addition to their performing, or even without their performing, the general "deliberative" functions of the rule-making process. Here legislators can "ratify" decisions made elsewhere, "promulgate" so that decisions made elsewhere can become "effective", or, they can perform the important functions of "information-gathering and organizing".<sup>3</sup> Other functions may be added to the list. These, as Wahlke points out, "ordinarily have a great deal to do with "legitimizing", or making authoritative, important classes of decisions, wherever they might be made in the political system".<sup>4</sup> Legitimization, as described by Wahlke, may in turn involve "representation" of groups and interest, "symbol-manipulation" (i.e. providing cues to political publics for responding to legislative actions,) "administrative oversight", and "adjudication".<sup>5</sup>

#### Second Chambers in General: Their Functions

Second chambers can and do perform any or all of the above functions. However, for the sake of clarity I have chosen two descriptive terms which will be used throughout this treatment of the functions of the Senate. These are what will be referred to as the Senate's general legislative and federal-representational functions.

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<sup>3</sup>Wahlke et al., p. 6

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



The first term refers to the Senate's role as a second chamber in a general sense - the extent to which it performs the various functions that have been traditionally expected of second chambers and those that are expected of them today.

The traditional general legislative role of second chambers was that of a protector of conservative and propertied interests. However today in parliamentary systems with sole Cabinet responsibility to the popularly elected chambers, this role is antiquated. No longer are second chambers expected to check the people and to act as bulwarks against democratic progress. Members of second chambers as a result have had to find for themselves new roles, new channels of involvement in the legislative process.

These new channels of involvement have for the most part been found in the non-decision-making aspect of the legislative process. Legislators in second chambers may consider their body as a chamber for sober second thought, a body of review in order to keep the Cabinet responsible to the people and to prevent passage of hastily drafted or ill-considered legislation. Or, in view of their relative independence from partisan forces (this of course really only applies to the British House of Lords and the Canadian Senate), members of second chambers may feel that they are more objective in their review of legislation, and hence, consider their chamber to be ideally suited for "in depth study" of legislation, and the major social and political problems of the day. Finally, members of these second chambers will point to the fact that they have more time on their hands than do the members of the lower house and conclude that they could do a great deal to ease the work load of the lower chamber.





By the second term, the second chambers' federal-representational functions, I am referring to an aspect of the general legislative functions mentioned above, however, one that is an important enough aspect in the case of second chambers to be considered separately from the general legislative functions. The point that I wish to make is that in all of the six federal systems among those nations to which we refer as modern democratic states<sup>6</sup> second chambers were constituted, at least ostensibly, to give some sort of "weighted" representation to states or areas for the purpose of providing them with a means by which they would be able to protect themselves from having their rights usurped by the majority in the lower chambers of the respective countries.<sup>7</sup> Since this federal-representational role is the basis of the existence of second chambers in all of these nations it seems reasonable that the role merits discussion separately from our discussion of the Senate as a legislature in the general sense of the term.

The Canadian Senate as a Second Chamber: The Intentions of  
the Fathers of Confederation

It is difficult to ascertain precisely what the Fathers of Confederation intended for the Senate as a second chamber. In view of what Robert A. MacKay terms, "The particularism and the fears of the smaller

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<sup>6</sup>These are Canada, Australia, the United States, West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.

<sup>7</sup>Some of the second chambers have been designed to perform more positive functions in addition to this function. Especially notable among these is the German Bundesrat which works effectively as a permanent body for communication between the Laender and the Federal Government and co-ordination of their activities. However, a role such as this cannot be realistically used as "common denominator" in a study of the federal-representational role of second chambers in federal systems in general.



provinces (and, for that matter, the French minority),"<sup>8</sup> the Founding Fathers were certainly concerned with the idea of incorporating into the federal union at least "the appearance of a mechanism that would provide strong safe-guards for both the provincial and sectional interests".<sup>9</sup>

A sampling of statements by the Fathers of Confederation on the role of the Senate as a protector of provincial and sectional interests perhaps should be made to help substantiate this observation. For instance Sir John A. Macdonald said about the Senate:

In order to protect local interests, and to prevent sectional jealousies, it was found requisite that the great divisions into which British North America is separated, should be represented in the Upper House on the principle of equality.<sup>10</sup>

George Etienne Cartier declared:

We have two races of people whose interests are distinct from each other in respect to origin, language and religion. In preparing the business of the Confederation at Quebec, we have to conciliate these two interests, and to give the country a Constitution which might reconcile the conservative with the democratic element.<sup>11</sup>

Finally George Brown said regarding the Senate that:

.....the very essence of our compact is that the Union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step, and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Robert A. MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), p. 37.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>10</sup>Parliamentary Debates on Confederation of the British North American Provinces (Quebec, 1865; Ottawa, 1951), p. 29. For a more accessible edition of the same see P.B. Waite (ed.), The Confederation Debates (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963).

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 571.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 88.





Clearly then, at least ostensibly, the Senate's first duty was to be a federal-representational one of protecting the interests of the provinces and the sections.

However, a closer look at what two of these three key Fathers said makes it questionable as to whether or not the Senate's involvement in this field was to be very extensive. For example Macdonald said about the Senate when dealing with the possibility of a deadlock between the House of Commons and the Senate:

It must be an independent House, having a free action of its own for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and preventing any hasty or ill considered legislation which may come from that body, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people. <sup>13</sup>

George Brown indicated even more strongly that the powers of the Upper House in its review of legislation would be limited when he said:

Honorable gentlemen may say that it [the Senate] will erect a barrier in the Upper House against the just influence that Upper Canada will exercise, by her numbers, in the Lower House over general legislation of the country. That may be true, to a certain extent, but honorable gentlemen will bear in mind that the barrier, be it more or less, will not affect money bills. <sup>14</sup>

In view of the above quotations one might conclude, as some authors have, that the Senate was simply a ploy used by the Upper Canadians to secure the consent of the other areas to Confederation.<sup>15</sup> Those who take this view

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 36

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p.88

<sup>15</sup>This position is taken by F.A. Kunz in The Modern Canadian Senate: 1925-1963 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). See in particular p. 317.



are able to point to the Fathers' mention of the secondary roles of the Senate (i.e. "a check upon the Lower House, and hence upon the encroachment of democracy" and a protector of the interests of property<sup>16</sup>) and to the political and constitutional provisions that were bound to limit it (e.g. life appointment, appointment by the Crown, and property qualifications). However, even with the above it appears as if they overstate their case. Granted, it would be naive for us to assume that the motives of all of the Fathers were entirely sincere. What was said in the debates on the Senate and the provisions enumerated above seems to be ample indication that this was in fact not the case.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the institutionalization of the Senate's weaknesses was as much caused by errors in constitutional engineering as by a conscious attempt on the part of the Fathers to assure that the Senate would never provide a threat to the House of Commons. In the first place, with the example of the faults in the United States' system and the redundancy of the popularly elected Legislative Council in Upper Canada, it seemed both undesirable and unnecessary that the Senate should be popularly elected. In addition to this, the belief was widely held, "That sectional representation in the Cabinet, backed by its representatives in the Commons, would control the appointments to the Upper Chamber,"<sup>17</sup> and consequently provide adequately for the safeguarding of provincial and sectional interests.

As was said in the beginning of this section there is little doubt that the Senate was to have some meaningful role as a legislative body. Its

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<sup>16</sup>MacKay, p. 47.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p.43.





general legislative role was to be that of a second chamber of, in the words of Macdonald, "sober second thought...a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and preventing any hasty or ill considered legislation."<sup>18</sup> Besides this, it is clear that it was instituted to perform the role of a chamber for sober second thought in such a way that the sections and the provinces would be given a line of defense against the majority in the House of Commons.

Therefore, no matter how it was to be limited, or is today limited, it seems safe for us to say this much about the intended role of the Senate. It was expected by the Fathers of Confederation to play a significant role as a legislative chamber for sober second thought, and as a federal-representational legislature designed, no matter to what extent, to protect the interests of the provinces and the sections.

#### The Senate Since Confederation: Its Actual Role

Before discussing the actual role the Senate has played since Confederation, it is necessary to point out the inherent weaknesses which from constitutional and political standpoints automatically limit the Senate's potential sphere of political influence. These weaknesses are as follows:<sup>19</sup>

1. The Senate has no powers that are exclusive from those of the House of Commons.

2. The House of Commons has the sole power to originate all bills for the raising or spending of money.

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 36

<sup>19</sup>See MacKay, pp. 50-54, and R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 304.



3. The unwritten provision that the Cabinet is held responsible to the lower house and not the upper house.

4. Its membership lacks the prestige of the membership of the House of Lords in Britain (this factor being as much social as constitutional or political).

5. It lacks the independent power base held by the other second chambers in federal systems (i.e. the Australian and the United States Senates, the Austrian and German Bundesrats and the Swiss Council of States), and, hence, is able to swing less weight than any of the above when making its appeals, even if it does so in the name of the sections and provinces which its members theoretically represent.

6. Appointment by the Crown and consequently the Government of the day has undermined the Senators' independence of partisan considerations while appointment for life has both affected the Senate's effectiveness and public image.

With particular reference to the Senate's federal-representational role it is worth mentioning that, even if we were to disregard the above, it would appear to be no longer realistic to claim that the Senate allows for "weighted" representation for all of the "peripheral" sectional areas. This can be seen in Table I provided by Robert A. MacKay and Table II which was compiled by this author.

In view of this, even if the Senate were not as limited as it is constitutionally and politically in its power to perform effectively the functions of a check upon the activities of the House of Commons, with its present distribution of seats, it would seem hardly likely that its actions would reflect the functions for which it was primarily designed



TABLE I<sup>20</sup>

Senators According to Population  
(nearest thousand, census 1961)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Provincial Population Per Senator</u>	<u>Regional Population Per Senator</u>
Newfoundland	67,000	67,000
Prince Edward Island	26,000	60,000
Nova Scotia	73,000	
New Brunswick	61,000	
Quebec	215,000	215,000
Ontario	257,000	257,000
Manitoba	151,000	199,000
Saskatchewan	152,000	
Alberta	219,000	
British Columbia	271,000	

<sup>20</sup>MacKay, p. 122.





TABLE 2\*

Percentage of Senators as Compared to the  
Percentage of House of Commons Members

Province	Percentage of Senators in the Senate		Percentage of House of Commons Members in House of Commons		Ratio of Percentage of Senate Seats to Percentage of House Seats	
	Per Province	Per Region	Per Province	Per Region	By Province	By Region
Newfoundland	5.8 ( 6 )	5.8 ( 6 )	2.6 ( 7 )	2.6 ( 7 )	2.5	2.5
Prince Edward Island	3.8 ( 4 )		1.5 ( 4 )		2.5	2.4
Nova Scotia	9.8 (10)	23.5 (24)	4.5 (12)	9.8 (26)	2.2	
New Brunswick	9.9 (10)		3.8 (10)		2.6	
Quebec	23.5 (24)	23.5 (24)	28.3 (75)	28.3 (75)	0.8	0.8
Ontario	23.5 (24)	23.5 (24)	32.0 (85)	32.0 (85)	0.7	0.7
Manitoba	5.9 ( 6 )		5.3 (14)		1.1	0.9
Saskatchewan	5.9 ( 6 )	23.5 (24)	6.4 (17)	25.5 (70)	0.9	
Alberta	5.9 ( 6 )		6.4 (17)		0.9	
British Columbia	5.9 ( 6 )		8.3 (22)		0.7	

\* number of seats in brackets





(i.e. a line of defense for sectional interests). This can be said for all of the regions and for all of the provinces with the exception of the Maritimes, where the ratio of percentage of Senate seats to House of Commons seats is 2.5 for Newfoundland and 2.4 for the remaining provinces. Certainly the irony of this present arrangement is increased by the fact that British Columbia can no longer be considered as a member of the same region as the Prairie Provinces. Today we prefer to refer to the West in terms of the Prairie Provinces and the West Coast, a division which is more salient now that neither are any longer frontier areas.

Turning then to the role of the Senate since 1867 let us first deal with its role as a federal-representational second chamber.

In view of the preceding it should not be surprising for the reader to discover that Robert A. MacKay, after reflecting upon the role of the Senate from 1867 to 1962, states that the Senate, "Has rarely been appealed to as the champion of provincial or sectional rights, and, even when appealed to, it has not consistently supported claims to such rights."<sup>21</sup> While reviewing the Senate's role in legislation concerning the provinces from 1867 to 1927, he makes the following observations:

1. With regard to the extension of the franchise (an early battle between the Provinces and the Federal government) the Senate "switched sides from time to time".
2. It delayed or rejected legislation requested by particular provinces.
3. It followed the lead of the government of the day with regard to separate schools in new territories and provinces.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 113



4. With regard to railways, it supported provincial objectives and limited the scope of regulation "but not consistently".

5. In 1912 and 1913 when dealing with proposals for federal assistance to highways, it held that the federal funds should be apportioned to the government on some equitable basis.

6. With the conscription crisis of World War I, Quebec's "weighted representation" was of little use in the Senate although not because of lack of stalwartness on the part of her Quebec members but because of their lack of numbers.<sup>22</sup>

Similar observations are made with regard to the Senate's role in the amending process. Here MacKay notes that, "Not once did its majority support the views of those provinces objecting to the proposals of the federal government and not once was there a solid block of Senators from Quebec, the province most vocal in dissent, in opposition to the Federal Government." He adds that, "With the exception of the amendment of 1943 (this providing that the redistribution of seats in the House of Commons should be postponed until after the war), the provincial case, and there was a case, was more forcibly presented in the Commons than in the Senate."<sup>23</sup>

In this context, F.A. Kunz who is more generous in his treatment of the role of the Senate in safeguarding provincial and sectional rights than this author or MacKay, states that "The fact that the Senate is not a primary safeguard of provincial rights should not be taken to imply that it has no useful function to perform as a reinforcement of provincial or sectional interests."<sup>24</sup> However, the examples he uses to fortify this view seem rather

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>24</sup>Kunz, p. 325.





forced.

One of these examples is the proposed amendment of 1936 which included an extension of the power of levying indirect taxes to the provinces.<sup>25</sup> This amendment was rejected by the Senate because it was believed it would have curtailed the constitutional powers of the federal government. It indeed is difficult to see how this case constitutes an instance where the Senate has acted to protect the provinces or the sections.

Equally unconvincing is Kunz's assessment of the Senate's role as a modifier of government legislation in the interests of provinces and sections. Kunz makes a noble effort by citing such cases as the 1925 Canteen Funds Distribution Bill; the 1935 Criminal Code; the 1940 R.C.M.P. Bill; and, the 1940 Northwest Territories Bill.<sup>26</sup> A close look at these pieces of legislation, however, does not leave one with a clear impression of what could be termed a substantive role in the overall protection of provincial and sectional interests. In the case of the 1925 Canteen Funds Distribution Bill the Senate inserted an amendment in the provision which called for \$2,300,000 to be distributed among returned soldiers and stipulated that the funds should be distributed by the existing machinery of the provinces.<sup>27</sup> With the 1935 Criminal Code the Senate, (a) deleted Paragraph F which made it an offense to deduct funds from any employee's wages for any purpose not warranted by law unless such a deduction had been approved by a

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 325.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 326-335.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 327. It is worth noting that in this case as Kunz indicates, the Government was being pressured by ex-servicemen "who appeared to be hostile to the idea of a Dominion Veteran's Bureau."





competent public authority on the grounds that the paragraph violated civil rights, and, (b) at the request of the provincial law authorities, made the legal provisions more definite in regard to gambling devices found in stores and places where the public resorted. In the case of the 1940 R.C.M.P. Bill the Senate saw to it that the provincial governments must approve all contracts providing for the R.C.M.P. to assume police duties in municipalities. Finally, in the 1940 Northwest Territories Bill the Senate provided that jurisdiction in civil matters over the Northwest Territories would be divided among the courts of eight provinces rather than given to the Ontario superior courts.

It is worth mentioning, however, that even though there is no clear evidence that the Senate has played a substantive role in the protection of provincial and sectional interests, instances such as the ones above have occurred more often in cases where the Senators from the Maritimes have been particularly active in advocating amendments.<sup>28</sup> This seems to be particularly significant in view of the fact the Maritimes, as we have seen above, is the only section which truly has "weighted" representation in the Senate.

Regarding the Senate's general legislative role, the Senate has been just as much affected by the realities of present day Cabinet government as the House of Lords. It seems quite apparent that the days of second chambers acting as the protectors of the propertied and conservative interest have passed, and we prefer today to refer to them as chambers for sober second thought and "in depth study" of legislation.

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 328.



The problem is that with this transition it is now quite a bit more difficult to pin-point a general legislative function for the Senate that is anything more than nebulous. Kunz boils down the present role as one consisting of two objectives. In the first place, the Senate is to "prevent the practice of government by decree, whenever it [can] be done without jeopardizing the underlying legislative policy". Secondly, the Senate must, "see to it that in the course of legislation the interests and the rights of the ordinary person [are] not pushed aside to any unreasonable degree."<sup>29</sup> Kunz goes into great detail in an attempt to impress the reader that the Senate has played an active role in regard to the first of the two functions.<sup>30</sup> Frankly though, one does not come away feeling confident that the Senate has done terribly much in this regard that would not have been done in the House of Commons if the Senate had not taken the initiative. In other words, none of the initiatives were of such a nature that if they were taken in the House of Commons, by either side, they would be so opposed to Government policy that they would not get serious consideration.

On the subject of the second substantive role, although MacKay in his review of the role of the Senate in the protection of the rights of individuals since 1867 finds that the Senate "can scarcely be said to have been consistent or unduly vigilant",<sup>31</sup> Kunz again goes into a detailed account of the Senate's role in this field since 1925.<sup>32</sup> Admittedly, the.

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 294.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 294 - 304.

<sup>31</sup>MacKay, p. 124.

<sup>32</sup>Kunz, pp. 304-315.







Senate has been outstanding in its protection of individual rights in two cases: The Customs Tariffs Bill of 1961, which sought to give the Minister of National Revenue absolute power to fix the rates of customs duties (here the Senate amended the Bill to make ministerial rate-fixing appealable to the Tariff Board), and The Bank of Canada Bill in 1961 which tried to oust Bank of Canada Governor James E. Coyne, without hearing, by Act of Parliament (here the Senate gave Mr. Coyne "his day in court").<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how Kunz can conclude about the activities of the Senate in this regard that it "has acted in the capacity of a sort of institutional Ombudsman in the Canadian parliamentary system".<sup>34</sup>

It is in the area of technical revision of legislation that a search for a significant role for the Senate is more fruitful. Through the use of its Committees the Senate has played an important role in making simple drafting corrections or administrative improvements, and incorporating in legislation provisions that are requested by the government in the "eleventh hour" of the legislative process. The usefulness of this review applies both to legislation already passed by the House of Commons and legislation of a complex or highly technical nature that is introduced in the Senate and reviewed in committee before it reaches the House.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>In the latter case the Senate came through it all with a halo, however, a slightly tarnished one. As Kunz himself admits this was the period where John Diefenbaker was riding high with his majority of seats in the House of Commons while the majority in the Senate was Liberal and "may have been colored by partisan considerations". The possibility is certainly a great deal more than remote and this being the case is deserving of more than a "may have".

<sup>34</sup>Kunz, p. 314.

<sup>35</sup>Detailed studies of this technical role may be found in MacKay, pp. 82-95, and Kunz, pp. 175-220.



In conclusion, it is difficult to discern what may be termed a substantive role in either our federal-representational or general legislative functional categories. The lion's share of the Senate's work then consists of technical reviews of legislation for the purpose of helping the House of Commons carry its burden of legislation. Its role in this field can be legal, administrative, or educational. Through its review of legislation it can assure that legislation is legally and administratively sound; and, through investigations, and committee work it can investigate public problems and issues, even beyond those arising out of legislation.

Having outlined, perhaps in a contracted form, the role of the Senate today let us turn now to the Senators' perceptions of their role as legislators. In the next chapter we will concern ourselves with the Senators' orientations to a federal-representational role, and in Chapter III we will deal with the Senators' orientations to a general legislative role.





## CHAPTER II

### CANADIAN SENATORS' PERCEPTIONS OF A FEDERAL- REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE

There are several interpretations of the Senate's federal-representational role but all seem to be based on one common assumption. This assumption is that no matter what the Senate's present federal representational role the Senators are as much disposed, if not more disposed, to the safeguarding of the interests of the sections and the provinces as are the members of the House of Commons.

Partially to test this hypothesis this author conducted forty-nine personal interviews with a cross-section of Canadian Senators in May and June of this year.<sup>1</sup>

In assessing the degree to which Canadian Senators view themselves as protectors of provincial and sectional interests it was felt that three indices of role perception would be particularly of use in the case of the Senate. These are the Senators' purposive roles, their areal roles, and their party vs. province roles. Briefly, the first term refers to the way the Senators perceive their jobs as lawmakers or legislators, the second term to the geographical area which the Senators perceive themselves to be representing, and the third to the way in which the Senators see themselves as resolving the conflicts between their loyalties to their provinces and their parties.

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<sup>1</sup>The methodological aspects of this study are outlined in Appendix I.





## Indices of Senators' Role Perception

Purposive Roles.-- The first dimension of the Senators' role perceptions, their purposive roles, was determined by the following open-end question:

What are the most important things you want to accomplish as a Senator?

Answers to this question were grouped according to three orientations to the Senators' legislative goals. These orientations are a general legislative orientation, a mixed orientation, and an area or provincial orientation.

The following responses illustrate the first orientation where Senators emphasized a general interest in the legislative process or referred to a particular area of policy-making in which they were particularly interested:

I want to do my part in preventing bad laws from going on the statute books. There are scores of bills that come out of the House half baked.

or

I want to do my utmost to take advantage of this opportunity to participate in the Canadian legislative process. In particular, I am interested in protecting Canadian national sovereignty and promoting the left-wing approach to the state.

or

As a Liberal, I support the Liberal program and do everything in my power to see it carried out. As a Senator, I feel that it is important that I see that the legislation that reaches the Senate is licked into shape.

Under the second orientation we find that Senators combined some province-based or parochial interest with a general legislative or policy-orientation. Examples of these mixed goal orientations are:



I want to see that the legislation that comes to the Senate benefits Canada generally and is not legislation that is designed to discriminate against any area. After all, the main purpose of the Senate is to give equal representation to each area.

or

I will endeavor to get the best possible legislation for the best interests of the majority of the Canadian people. I am also interested in industrial development, particularly industrial development that will benefit my province.

Finally, typical of the responses that indicate area orientations, that is those of Senators whose goals tended to focus solely upon their provinces, are:

As a British Columbian I would like to make sure that the legislation that goes through Parliament takes into account the existence of British Columbia. This is my primary goal, and I can do a tremendous amount of work here. This is one reason why I commute between B.C. and Ottawa.

or

My part of the country is a have-not area. My primary interest is in representing this area and looking out for its well-being.

or

You would be surprised at the number of little requests that I get from the people of my province. The people of my province appreciate my doing these favours and I like to do as much as I can for them.

Areal Roles.-- The question that was asked to determine the Senators' foci of representation was:

Some Senators feel that their primary responsibility as a representative is to their province first and then their region or to the country as a whole. Others feel differently. How do you feel about this?





The responses to the above question fell under three categories, national focus, blurred focus, and provincial focus.

Those with a national representational focus perceived themselves as representatives of the nation as a whole. Typical of their responses are the following:

I agree with what Edmund Burke said in his speech to the electors of Bristol. I have a certain obligation to the people of my province, but this must never interfere with my primary responsibility which is that of a representative of Canada as a whole. I will always take the broader view.

or

I hold the reverse. My primary responsibility as a representative is to the country as a whole.

or

There is too much of a tendency toward regionalism these days. My duty, above all else, is to Canada.

Under the blurred category it is found that respondents tended to hedge around the issue and did not give a clear idea of what they felt was their primary area of representation. Examples of their responses are:

In my mind there is no priority. Each issue brings out different sets of priorities. You have conflicts and you must always ask yourself just how parochial or nationally minded can you afford to be.

or

My first responsibility is to my province and my community. However, on matters of policy I consider the country as a whole. Usually you'll find that Senators on crucial issues will try to control parochial feelings.

Finally, typical of the responses of those who saw their province as their primary focus of representation are:



My region and my province come first. After all, this is the basis of representation in the Senate.

or

The Maritime Provinces entered Confederation under the condition that they would have special representation in the Upper House. My duty is to see that this condition is carried out.

Party vs. Provincial Roles.-- One gets the impression from reading the Confederation debates and the literature on the Senate that no matter how Senators perceive their role they should at all times act independently from partisan considerations. In this case, no matter what their party's position on a certain legislative issue Senators would be obliged to consider above all the interests of their section or province unless, of course, in their own judgment they could not follow the dictates of the people of their province. Presumably they would assume this stand if they thought the legislation was bad for the country or if they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the best interests of their respective sections or provinces.

In order to find the Senators' orientations along these lines the following question was asked:

If you felt that a majority of the people in your province were opposed to your party's stand on a legislative issue, how would you probably vote on the issue?

In this case we again have three basic categories, these being "pure" party loyalty, "politico" orientation, and "pure" provincial loyalty (the Senators under the "politico" orientation indicated that they felt they would decide on the legislation on the basis of its merits alone).





Examples of the first are:

I would vote with my party. There is no question about that.

or

I have voted against my party but I doubt if I would vote against it because I felt the majority of the people in my province were against its stand on a certain issue.

Typical of the second category are:

Senators don't practice partisan politics. I have the same approach to my membership in the Liberal party as I do to the fact that I am a representative of Quebec. The same principle applies in both cases. I consider the common good above all else.

or

I would vote contrary to the wishes of the people if, in my judgment, their position was not well founded.

or

I would attempt to get the matter changed before it became law. I would make the caucus aware of the position of the people of my province and would talk it up with fellow Senators. If they didn't see things the way I did then I still think that you should not be pressured either way. You should be allowed to decide each case on its merits.

Finally, the "provincial" orientation may be illustrated by:

If the feeling of this majority was strong enough I would vote for my province.

or

I would vote with my people. After all, I'm their representative.

or

I would vote for what I thought was in the best interests of the people of my province.



Along each of the above dimensions the responses provide rather striking evidence that the Senators for the most part have very weak orientations to a federal-representational role. It would be expected that if there were strong feelings on their part towards such a role that they would rate relatively high on the side of a "provincial" orientation in their perceptions of their purposive, representational, and party vs. provincial roles. Quite decidedly this is not the way it turned out.

In the case of their perceptions of their purposive roles 78% of the Senators indicated a general legislative or policy orientation, 8% a mixed orientation, and 14% an area orientation. Under focus of representation it was found that 74% had a national focus of representation, 10% a blurred focus, and 16% a provincial focus. Again, in the case of their party vs. provincial orientations the Senators showed a very low provincial orientation with only 11% falling under this category. It should not come as a surprise, however, that the "politico" orientation was indicated by the majority of the Senators. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of the Senators came under this category while only 11% indicated a strong loyalty to their party. This can partially be explained by a feeling that is prevalent among Senators that they are less affected by partisan politics than are M.P.s and thus tend more to decide cases on their merits. Also this tendency was no doubt reinforced by the strong general legislative purposive role and the national representational foci that were shown to be evident in the other two dimensions. The above data is summarized in Table 3.





TABLE 3

Purposive, Representational, and Party vs. Province  
Orientations of Canadian Senators

	Purposive Role (N=49)			Represt. Focus (N=49)		Party vs. Prov. (N=46)			
Percentage taking	Gen.Leg.	Mix	Area	Nat.	Blur	Prov.	Party Pol.	Prov.	
	78%	8%	14%	74%	10%	16%	11%	78%	11%

Recalling the original hypothesis of this chapter that the Senators are as much disposed if not more disposed to the safeguarding of the interests of the sections and the provinces than are the members of the House of Commons it is quite clear that the data does not bear this out. Comparative data is not available on the role perceptions of members of the House of Commons in the party vs. province dimension but the results of a 1962 study of the House of Commons by Allan Kornberg indicates that M.P.s tend much more than do the Senators to have "provincial" orientations. This can be seen by the data presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4<sup>2</sup>

Purposive and Representational Role Orientations of  
Canadian Members of Parliament and Canadian  
Senators

	Purposive Role			Repres. Focus		
	Gen.Leg or Pol.	Mix	Area	Nat.	Blur	Distr. or Prov.
M.P.s (N=165)	47%	30%	23%	47%	19%	34%
Senators (N=49)	78%	8%	14%	74%	10%	16%

<sup>2</sup>Data on M.P.s found in Allan Kornberg, "Some Differences in Role Perceptions Among Canadian Legislators" (Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1964), p. 67.



Be this as it may, a number of significant observations may be made regarding the way in which the Senators have assumed their purposive, representational, and party vs. province roles. In the first place, there appears to be a good deal of interrelatedness between the three roles. By this it is meant that there is a relatively high correlation between the orientations indicated by individual Senators in the three dimensions.

Secondly, various relations are found between the roles assumed by the Senators and a number of independent variables. These independent variables are the Senators' areas of representation, ages, party affiliations, political careers, party careers, and regimes of appointment.

We will deal with the interrelatedness of the three basic roles in the section to follow.

#### Interrelatedness of the Basic Roles

It seems reasonable to assume that if the three indices of the Senators' orientations were perfectly accurate there would be a perfect correlation between the roles assumed within the three dimensions. Such an accuracy of course would be demanding too much of our tools of measure. Nevertheless, a fairly high correlation between the ways the various roles are assumed should be expected if the indices are sufficiently accurate to be useful.

This certainly seems to be the case with the interrelatedness of the Senators orientations under the purposive and representational categories (See Table 5).





TABLE 5

Relation Between Purposive Role and Representational Focus

	Gen.Leg.	Mixed	Area
National	81%	75%	29%
Blurred	11%	0	14
Province	8	25	57
Total	100% (N=38)	100% (N=4)	100% (N=7)
Cumulative Score*	2.68	2.50	1.71
Total Cum. Score			2.57

$$\text{Gamma} = .69^3$$

\*This score will be used throughout this study. It is calculated in each case by assigning three points for each response under the various categories that is found in the first column, two for the second, and one for the third. In this way an average score is established and the reader can tell at a glance how the distribution under each category compares with this score.

<sup>3</sup>This statistic is proposed by Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal in "Measures of Associations for Cross-Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 44 (Dec., 1954). By convention a Gamma of .50 is supposed to indicate what the authors term a "substantive relation".



The degree of interrelatedness between the Senators' purposive roles, and their party vs. provincial roles; and, their representational foci and party vs. provincial roles, however, seems considerably weaker. (See Tables 6 and 7).

TABLE 6

Relation Between Purposive Role and Party vs.  
Provincial Role

	Gen.Leg.	Mixed	Area
Party	11%	25%	0%
Politico	83	75	57
Province	6	0	43
	100% (N=35)	100% (N=4)	100% (N=7)
Cumulative Score	2.06	2.25	1.57
Total Cum. Score			2.00

TABLE 7

Relation Between Foci of Representation and Party vs.  
Provincial Role

	National	Blurred	Province
Party	12%	0%	13%
Politico	82	80	62
Province	6	20	25
	100% (N=33)	100% (N=5)	100% (N=8)
Cumulative Score	2.06	1.80	1.88
Total Cum. Score			2.00





## Major Independent Variables and Senators' Role Perceptions

As mentioned before there are several independent variables that seem to be relevant to an analysis of the way in which the Senators have perceived their purposive, areal, and party vs. provincial roles. These are their areas of representation, their political careers, their party careers, their party affiliations, their regimes of appointment, and their ages.

Area of Representation.-- Area of Representation seems to be a logical choice as a determinant of role-taking in our three dimensions. Ostensibly, at least, the Senate was instituted to give "weighted" representation to Quebec, and the Maritimes; and, when each of the Prairie Provinces and B.C. were given provincial status the same principle of "weighted" representation was applied. It seems reasonable for us to expect then that the Senators from these sections would have a greater consciousness of their federal-representation role and this would be reflected in their responses in the three indices discussed above.

Furthermore, we know from the records of the Senators from these sections that, although the Senate's work in this regard has been limited, the Senators from the Maritimes have the best record in the "protection" of sectional and provincial interest. The West comes second and Quebec a poor third.<sup>4</sup> Again, it is assumed that these records are but reflections of varying intensities of consciousness of a federal-representational role according to area of representation.

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<sup>4</sup> Neither Kunz or MacKay rank the performance of the Senators in this way but the reader gets a distinct impression that this is the way their performances would be ranked by the two authors. See MacKay, pp. 112-123, and Kunz, pp. 316-336.



Looking at the data taken from the interviews it appears that the above assumptions are valid. This may be said even though the large majority of Senators failed to indicate "provincial" orientations in their responses to the three questions. Also it is found that with the exception of their party vs. provincial roles, the proportion of Senators assuming "more provincial"<sup>5</sup> roles is related to the records of the Senators from these areas in the "protection" of sectional and provincial interests (See Table 8).

Especially interesting in Table 8 is the extent to which the Quebec Senators assumed "provincial" orientations in the party vs. province dimension. This would appear especially difficult to understand in view of the fact that the Quebec sample, though smaller than the others, did not vary significantly from the other provinces in the distribution of the other independent variables. For some reason, however, the Quebec Senators' "loyalty" to the nation is not complemented by anywhere near the level of loyalty to party found among Ontario Senators. Perhaps this may be explained by the rather confused party structure in Quebec. It may also be that the party vs. province dichotomy is a clear enough one to raise the "nationalistic" feelings of the Quebec Senators. It is unfortunate that smallness of the Quebec sample does not allow us to go into this matter more deeply.

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<sup>5</sup>With the term "more provincial" the number of Senators in each area assuming "mixed" roles is taken into account, as well as the number that assume "provincial" roles.





# Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Areas of Representation

## Area of Representation

Ont. P.Q. West Mar.				Ont. P.Q. West Mar.				Ont. P.Q. West Mar.						
Gen. Leg.	100%	100%	67%	53%	Nat.	92%	78%	84%	47%	Party	23%	0%	8.3	7%
Mix	0	0	8	20	Blur.	8	22	8	7	Pol.	77	71	83.4	79
Prov.	0	0	25	27	Prov.	0	0	8	46	Prov.	0	29	8.3	14
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%				Total 100% 100% 100% 100%				Total 100% 100% 100% 100%						
N=(13) (9) (12) (15)				N=(13) (9) (12) (15)				N=(13) (7) (12) (14)						
Cum. Score	3.00	3.00	2.42	2.27	Cum. Score	2.92	2.78	2.75	2.00	Cum. Score	2.23	1.71	2.00	1.93
Total Cum. Score				2.63	Total Cum. Score				2.57	Total Cum. Score				2.00
Gamma = .76				Gamma = .63				Gamma = .32						



Political Career.-- One might expect that if a Senator has at one time been a popularly-elected representative of his people (either in the House of Commons, his Provincial Legislature, or his local government) that he would have a greater orientation to a representational role than would other Senators with no previous political career. If this were the case, then it would seem to follow that with a previous political career Senators with formerly strong feelings of loyalty to their electors would carry these with them to the Senate. Perhaps as a result they would fit rather well into the federal-representational role which has been a topic of discussion in this chapter.

The survey data, however, does not indicate that this is the case (See Table 9). Except for the areal-role dimension, Senators with previous political careers do not show any stronger "provincial" orientations than those without previous political careers. It is true that under the areal dimension considerably more Senators indicated that their focus of representation was their province. However, especially in view of the fact that this tendency is not evident in the other two dimensions, how much of this is due to genuine "provincial" orientations and how much is but a product of nostalgia for the old constituency or legislative district?

Party Career.-- It would seem, as in the case with a previous political career, that a Senator's party career before his appointment to the Senate would affect his perspective in terms of his perceived role.<sup>6</sup> In this case, we are assuming that if a Senator has at one time held a leadership position, on any level, in his party this should tell us something about his political socialization, and hence, his orientations. This is said because it is felt that the very fact that the Senator once held a leadership position in his party assumes what may be termed a "special" loyalty to his party.

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<sup>6</sup>A Senator here is said to have had a party career if he has held some executive position in his party on any level.





TABLE 9.

Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Political Careers

Political Career															
Pol. Career			No Pol. Career			Pol. Career			No Pol. Career						
Gen. Leg.	77%		79%		Nat.	67%		84%		Party	10%		12.5%		
Mix	10		5		Blur	10		11		Pol.	80		75.0		
Prov.	13		16		Prov.	23		5		Prov.	10		12.5		
Total	100%		100%		Total	100%		100%		Total	100%		100.0%		
N= (30)				(19)				N= (30)				(16)			
Cum. Score	2.63		2.63		Cum. Score	2.43		2.63		Cum. Score	2.00		2.00		
Total Cum. Score			2.63		Total Cum. Score			2.51		Total Cum. Score			2.00		



It may also be expected that, as a result of this loyalty, the Senators who have held leadership positions would have a higher proportion indicating a party orientation in the party vs. province dimension. Perhaps too, assuming unified national parties this loyalty would show up in the form of higher general legislative and national orientations in the purposive and areal dimensions respectively.

Again, however, the data does not indicate that this is in fact so (See Table 10). If anything, it would appear that those who have held party leadership positions at one time tend more to assume "provincial" roles in the first two dimensions while in the third, although they tend slightly more to assume "party" roles, they have the identical tendency to assume "provincial" roles.

There is one factor here that would seem to lessen the effect of leadership positions on the Senators' political socialization. It must be remembered that Canadian parties have federal structures. As a result, a great deal of the political socialization of these Senators who have held leadership positions has taken place in provincial organizations. As a result, it seems reasonable to expect that their loyalties to their parties would be based to a relatively high degree on the more parochial loyalties to their provincial parties.

Party Affiliations.-- No effort will be made in this study to link the role perceptions of Canadian Senators with the "ideological" stances of their respective parties. There is serious doubt as to whether or not an attempt at delineating ideological differences between the two parties can be a fruitful enterprise with the programs of the two parties being as close as they are to each other. Besides, even if this could be done it is difficult





# Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Party Careers

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to see how we would link these stances with role-taking.

Nevertheless there seems to be some merit in approaching the two parties from the point of view that one is the "government" party whereas the other is the "opposition" party.

Regarding this Allan Kornberg in his 1962 study of role perception in the House of Commons develops the thesis that members of the Conservative party would likely find that a role style which tends to de-emphasize constituent pressures and demands was a rather unrealistic one. Kornberg felt that this would be so because: (1) it was necessary to "tap" the feelings at the grass roots in order to assist the government in formulating policy, (2) because they controlled the various departments they could better satisfy requests from departments of Government, and (3) because they were a minority Government they, for purposes of survival, had to be more sensitive to parochial claims.<sup>7</sup> Kornberg's data bore this thesis out; however, the data collected in this study does not (See Table 11). In fact, if anything the Conservative Senators who are now the "opposition" party members seem to have a stronger tendency to assume "provincial" roles than do the Liberals.

It should not be claimed, however, that this disproves Kornberg's thesis. Senators are in very different positions from M.P.s and it would not seem possible to compare the two from a party standpoint. Moreover, the reader should not conclude from the above that some "ideological" differences between the two parties must cause the differences in the Senators' orientations. It should be remembered that the Conservative Senators are younger on average than are the Liberals and have more recent times of appointment. Both of these independent variables, to varying degrees, are shown to affect role taking with the younger and more recently appointed Senators tending more to assume "provincial" orientations.

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<sup>7</sup>Kornberg, pp. 90-91.





TABLE 11

Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Party Affiliations

Party											
Liberal			Conservative			Party					
Liberal			Conservative			Liberal			Conservative		
Gen. Leg.	79%	72%	Nat.	76%	67%	Part.	11%	11%			
Mix.	7	11	Blur.	10	11	Pol.	82	73			
Prov.	14	17	Prov.	14	22	Prov.	7	16			
Total 100%			100%			Total 100%			100%		
N=(29)			(18)			N= (27)			(18)		
Cum. Score	2.66	2.56	Cum. Score	2.62	2.44	Cum. Score	2.04	1.94			
Total Cum. Score		2.62	Total Cum. Score		2.55	Total Cum. Score		2.00			
Gamma = .37			Gamma = .00			Gamma = .21					



Regime of Appointment.-- Regarding the Senators' regimes of appointment, a look at Table 12 shows that regimes of appointment and the three core variables are interrelated; however, not in the same way. Clearly, the more recent the Senator's appointment the more likely he is to assume a "provincial" role under the purposive dimension. This does not seem to be startling particularly if it is assumed that the Pearson appointees, because a good number of them have only recently been removed from either the House of Commons or from provincial legislatures, have carried with them the orientations that they had in either the House or one of the provincial legislatures. For example, if a former M.P. was considered by the House and much of the nation as a representative of Prairie agricultural interests one might expect that he would continue to see himself in this light for quite some time in the Senate even if he was not actively involved in such a representational role.

However, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the distribution of responses in the areal dimension. Here, although the differences are by no means as great as they are in the purposive dimension, it appears that the longer the Senator has sat in the Senate the more likely he is to assume a "provincial" focus. It should however be pointed out that there appears to be a counter tendency among the older members that would make their provincial foci seem greater than would be expected, judging from their responses in the purposive dimension. It was found later in the questionnaire (see Appendix II, Question 28) that the older Senators who indicated a provincial focus showed a marked tendency to base their orientation on a literal interpretation of the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. On the other hand, it was found that the Pearson appointees were the group most likely to say in reference





TABLE 12\*

Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Regimes of Appointment

Regime											
Pre-Dief. Pearson				Pre-Dief. Pearson				Pre-Dief. Pearson			
Gen. Leg.	95%	72%	50%	Nat.	76%	72%	70%	Party	0%	11%	30%
Mix.	0	11	20	Blur	5	11	20	Pol.	94	72	60
Prov.	5	17	30	Prov.	19	17	10	Prov.	6	17	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	Total	100%	100%	100%	Total	100%	100%	100%
N= (21) (18) (10)				N= (21) (18) (10)				N= (18) (18) (10)			
Cum. Score	2.90	2.56	2.20	Cum. Score	2.57	2.56	2.60	Cum. Score	1.94	1.94	2.20
Total Cum. Score	2.63		2.63	Total Cum. Score	2.57		2.57	Total Cum. Score	2.00		
Gamma = .67				Gamma = .048				Gamma = .30			

\*The King and St. Laurent samples are grouped together and titled "Pre-Diefenbaker" regime. Senator Aseltine, the only representative of the Bennett regime, was not interviewed.



to the federal-representational role that it was unrealistic given the present constitutional position of the Senate. Again however, the differences are not great so caution should be exercised in any attempt to explain the differences.

The differences in the party vs. province dimensions are somewhat greater and perhaps more revealing. However, they do not go in any one direction which makes it difficult to assess exactly what they mean.

Of course, one of the most frequently heard criticisms of the Senate is that although it is supposed to be independent of partisan forces, the Senators just the same carry with them into the Senate a strong loyalty to the party that appointed them. Perhaps the high level of the Pearson appointees' party loyalty is an indication of the validity of this claim. Also one could see the low level of party loyalty among the Pre-Diefenbaker appointees as an indication that as Senators take on the "objective" spirit of the Senate the intensity of this loyalty is lessened.

Age.-- In our sample there is quite clearly a strong correlation between the age of Senators and the regime in which they were appointed (See Table 13).

TABLE 13

The Relation Between Senators' Regimes of  
Appointment and Their Ages

	Pre-Dief	Dief.	Pearson
75-90	52%	29%	0%
60-74	43	38	0
40-59	5	33	100
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=21)	(N=18)	(N=10)

$$\text{Gamma} = .80$$





As a consequence it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the differences from regime to regime are due to shifting loyalties (either representational or party) or to the differences in age. So far as the relation between age and the three dimensions of the Senators' federal-representational roles is concerned, it would seem only reasonable that as a man gets older he would lose touch with his province and perhaps what formerly was a fairly strong federal-representational orientation.

In Table 14 the data under the purposive dimension indicate that this is the case. However, as was the case with regime of appointment the distributions in the other two dimensions do not fit the hypothesis. In neither case are the differences great enough to permit generalizations. However, under foci of representation and regime of appointment, the differences seem to be those between the "traditionalists" and the "realists".

Finally, regarding the third dimension, it could be concluded that the fact that 18% of the Senators in the age group of 40-59 indicated a party orientation points to the validity of the hypothesis that more recent appointees have stronger bonds of loyalty with their party.<sup>7</sup> However, it would be difficult to say just how we would reconcile this with the 13% of the Senators between the ages of 75 and 90 who have the same orientation.

Summary.-- The most significant revelation of the data in this chapter is the fact that a relatively small number of Senators indicated federal-representational roles according to their responses to the basic questions.

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<sup>7</sup>All of the Pearson appointees are between 40 and 59.



TABLE 14

## Senators' Roles in Relation to Their Ages

		Age			
		40-59	60-74	75-90	
Gen. Leg.	59%	87%	87%	87%	
Mix.	12	0	13	0	
Prov.	30	13	0	0	
Total		100%	100%	100%	
N= (17)		(16)	(16)	(16)	
Cum. Score	2.29	2.75	2.88	2.63	
Total Cum. Score					
Gamma = .54					
N= (17)		(17)	(16)	(16)	
Cum. Score	2.06	1.86	2.21	2.00	
Total Cum. Score					
Gamma = .00					





However, although on the whole few Senators indicated this orientation some observations could be made about the way in which they assumed their roles under the three dimensions.

In the first place, the role perceptions of the Senators' under all of the dimensions were interrelated, however, to different degrees. It was found in this respect that the responses of the Senators under the purposive and areal dimensions were highly interrelated, while the inter-relatedness of the party vs. province responses with those under the other two dimensions was only moderate.

It was also discovered that the Senators' role perceptions could be linked to a number of independent variables. Here the strongest relations were found between the Senators' role perceptions and their areas of representation, regimes of appointment, and ages.



### CHAPTER III

#### CANADIAN SENATORS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE SENATE'S GENERAL LEGISLATIVE ROLE

In this chapter we will try to determine two things. First, an attempt will be made to determine the way in which Senators view the Senate as a second chamber in Canada's parliamentary system. In other words, what function do they feel it is performing?

Secondly, we will discuss in detail the extent to which the Senators are satisfied or dissatisfied with the Senate, and their attitudes toward improvement of the Senate as a second chamber.

#### The Senate as a Second Chamber

The analysis in this section is based on three questions. The first question which was asked, after several questions had been asked on particular functions of the Senate, was:

Now speaking in general terms, what would you say is the role of the Senate today in Canada's parliamentary system?

The responses to this question were grouped into three groups which follow the three chief categories of possible functions for second chambers discussed in Chapter I. These are the general functions of (1) protection of conservative interests and the propertied, (2) general review of legislation and technical revision, and (3) protection of provincial and/or minority rights.

The second and third questions were asked, along with a number of others, in an attempt to ascertain the Senators' perceptions of what kind of work the Senate does in its review of legislation. The second was asked with the following preamble:





The Senate often revises government legislation: Do you think that Senators often see faults in pieces of government legislation that have been overlooked by the Government and the House of Commons?

If the respondent answered Yes (96% did) he was asked:

What sort of things?

The third question was as follows:

Would you care to name two or three things that in your mind the Senate as a legislative body can do better than the House of Commons?

The same three groupings were found in the Senators' responses to both questions. These were responses of those Senators who indicated that (1) they did not feel the Senate added anything in particular to the legislative process, or those that did feel the Senate added something to the legislative process but could not or would not articulate exactly what it added, (2) those who saw the most significant work of the Senate as being technical revision of legislation; or, (3) those who felt the Senate's most significant contribution is in the area of substantive revision of legislation.

Examples of responses to the two questions are not felt necessary in the case of the first category, however, examples should clarify the meaning of the latter two:

Typical of the responses to the second question of Senators who felt that the Senate's main contribution to the legislative process was in technical review is:

Most of the things that are brought up are fairly simple but important improvements in draftmanship. We have a number of sound legal minds here in the Senate and we seem particularly suited to this sort of review.

and of similar response to the third question,



Our committee work is much better than it is in the House. Further, we have more able lawyers and men with business experience than the House does. The Senate's part then is in the type of in-depth studies of the technical provisions of legislation that can best be carried out in the committee room.

An example of responses that indicated that the Senators saw the Senate performing a substantive function in its review of legislation in the case of the second question is:

We look at legislation from the opposite viewpoint that the House does. At all times we are asking ourselves whether or not the legislation is good for the people of Canada, and whether or not it is going to affect anybody adversely.

and in the case of the third question,

Just as in the House there is much diversity in the Senate. However, unlike the House, we are not under partisan or political pressures. It is for this reason that we can judge legislation on its merits and accept it or reject on the basis of what we think is best for the Canadian people.

The Senators in their responses to the first question (i.e. their perceptions of the role of the Senate in general) indicated rather clearly that the consensus in the Senate is that the Senate's most meaningful role is in review of legislation and in technical revisions (61%). However, 24% still see the Senate as a protector of the provinces and minorities, and 15% see it as a protector of conservative interests and the propertied.

In their responses to the two questions on the nature of the work of the Senate the Senators showed a high level of consistency with their perceptions of the general role of the Senate. In the case of the second question (i.e. the sorts of revisions the Senate makes), 71% thought they were mainly technical, 12% thought they were substantive, and 27% could not or would not articulate. In the case of what sort of things the Senators thought







the Senate could do better than the House of Commons, 61% thought it did better in technical review, 14% thought the review was better for substantive reasons, and 25% either did not think that it was better or did not articulate why they thought it was better. This data is summarized in Table 15.

TABLE 15

Senators' Responses Under the Three Role Questions

Gen. Role			Work (Rev.)			Work (Do Better)		
(N=46)			(N=49)			(N=49)		
Conserv.	Review	Protect	Noth.in	Part.Tech.	Subst.	Noth.in	Part.Tech.	Subst.
15%	61%	24%	27%	61%	12%	25%	61%	14%

As was the case with the Senators' perceptions of their purposive, representational, and party vs. province roles, a number of relations are found to exist between the above perceptions and some independent variables. In this case the independent variables that will be used are area of representation, party affiliation, regime of appointment, and age.

Area of Representation.-- With regard to the Senators' perceptions of the Senate's general role the relations did not turn out quite as expected. It was expected that the tendency of the Senators to assume greater provincial roles in the Maritimes, the West, and Quebec (in this order) would appear again in the Senators' perceptions of the Senate's general role. However, as it turned out this was not the case (See Table 16).



TABLE 16

Senators' Perceptions of the Senate's General  
Role by Area of Representation

	Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.
Conserv.	8%	11%	20%	21%
Review	77	56	40	65
Protect Prov. & Min.	15	33	40	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=13)	(N=9)	(N=10)	(N=14)

Tau-B (Kendall)= .08\*

\* This statistic is another measure of interrelatedness discussed briefly in Goodman and Kruskal, op.cit. However this measure differs from Gamma in that it does not require that there be an "order of interest" in the variables and at no time equals unity (i.e.  $\pm 1.0$ ). It is used here only to give the reader a rough idea of the interrelatedness of the variables in the various tables.

How this tendency of the Senators from the Maritimes to take the generalist's view in this case may be explained is not known. It was thought that an answer would be found in the Senators' responses to the two questions on the nature of the Senate's work (See Table 17). However, judging from the data above, the Maritime Senators seem to have "blurred" perceptions of what the Senate does. Hence we are not able to say that the Senators' perceptions of the general role of the Senate is related to the way in which they perceive the nature of the Senate's work.

Party.-- As was the case with the Senators' role orientations as representatives, on the surface at least party affiliation does not seem to have much of an effect on the Senators' perceptions of the Senate's role. However, for the benefit of those who would expect that the ideological differences in the two parties would be reflected by a greater tendency on the part of Conservatives to perceive the Senate as a body for the protection of conservative interests and propertied, the data in Table 18 show quite clearly that





this is not the case.

TABLE 17

Senators' Perceptions of the Nature of the  
Senate's Work by Area of Representation

	Work (Rev.)					Work (Do Better)			
	Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.		Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.
Noth. in Part.	23%	11%	8%	53%	Noth. in Part.	23%	22%	0%	47%
Tech.	69	67	67	47	Tech.	62	78	75	40
Subst.	8	22	25	0	Subst.	15	0	25	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=13)	(N=9)	(N=12)	(N=15)		(N=13)	(N=9)	(N=12)	(N=15)
	Tau-B = .22					Tau-B = .17			

TABLE 18

Senators' Perceptions of the Senate's General  
Role by Party Affiliation

	Liberal	P.C.
Conserv.	22%	6%
Review	63	59
Protect Prov. & Min.	15	35
	100%	100%
	(N=27)	(N=17)
	Tau-B = .29	



Age and Regime of Appointment.-- It was expected that the strongest relation between the Senators' perceptions of the role of the Senate would exist between the Senators' ages and regimes of appointment. In this section the two will be considered together.

With regard to age and the Senators' perceptions of the Senate's general role, again using the terms traditionalists and realists,<sup>1</sup> it would appear that the age group between 60 and 74 is more realistic than the age group between 75 and 90. What, however, was not expected is the tendency on the part of the youngest members to indicate traditional perceptions (See Table 19).

TABLE 19  
Senators' Perceptions of the Senate's General Role by Age

	75-90	60-74	40-59
Conserv.	21%	13%	12%
Review	50	73	59
Protect Prov. & Min.	29	13	29
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=17)	(N=15)	(N=17)

Tau-B = .07

<sup>1</sup>In this context responses under protection of conservative interests and the propertied, and the provinces and minorities could be classed as traditional while those under review of legislation and technical revisions would be classed as realistic (i.e. more in line with the actual functions of the Senate today).





In view of this it would seem that the explanation of Table 19 might be that the younger Senators tend more to be realistic in their appraisal of the role of the Senate but that they would have to have a "taste" of Senate work before they become more realistic. In this case regime of appointment (therefore, amount of experience in the Senate) would be as important a determinant as age. The data however do not seem to bear this hypothesis out (See Table 20). What does seem significant is the tendency among the Conservative Senators to see the Senate as a body protecting the provinces and minorities. It was not felt when we discussed party as a determinant of Senators' perceptions of the work of the Senate that a significant difference existed between the perceptions of Conservatives and Liberals. However, in Table 20 we have a fairly strong indication that we can at least say that the Diefenbaker appointees show a greater tendency than do the Pearson appointees to perceive traditional roles.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, it appears that no clear relationships exist between the Senators' regimes of appointment and their role perceptions in this dimension. This is with the exception of the relatively high percentage of Pre-Diefenbaker appointees who perceived the Senate as having a conservative role.

TABLE 20

Senators' Perceptions of the Senate's General Role by  
Regime of Appointment

	Pre-Dief.	Dief.	Pearson
Conserv.	26%	6%	10%
Review	58	59	70
Protect. Prov. & Min.	16	35	20
	100%	100%	100%
	(N=19)	(N=7)	(N=10)
Tau-B = .17			

<sup>2</sup>It is worth noting in this regard that three (3) of the six (6) Conservative Senators between the ages of 40 and 59 who were interviewed in-



Table 21 shows that (except for the fact that Pearson appointees have relatively high percentages under the "nothing in particular" and substantive categories in their responses) no clear relationship exists between age and regime of appointment in the Senators' responses to the question on the nature of the Senate's revisions of legislation. However, regarding the responses under the "do better" dimension some fairly strong relations seem to exist. The data above shows that both the younger Senators and the more recently appointed Senators not only tend more to indicate that they feel the Senate can do some things better than the House of Commons, but they also indicate a high amount of agreement in that they see the Senate's most effective channel of influence to be in the area of technical revisions of legislation. This fact may tell us more about the orientations of these people and hence the Senate of tomorrow. The point is that although the younger Senators and the more recently appointed Senators seemed to have confused ideas as to what the Senate does they are very clear on what they feel it is best equipped to do. One possible interpretation of this apparent discrepancy between what the younger Senators think the Senate is doing and what they feel it is best equipped to do could be that these Senators, though they see that the Senate does at times make substantive revisions, do not feel that the Senate should involve itself in this sort of review.

Senators: Satisfied or Dissatisfied

Four questions were asked to determine the Senators' levels of satisfaction with the Senate and their attitudes toward changes in the work





TABLE 21

Senators' Perceptions of the Nature of the Senate's Work as Related to Their Regimes of Appointment and Their Ages

Ages				Regimes of Appointment			
Work (Rev.)		Work (Do Better)		Work (Rev.)		Work (Do Better)	
75-90	60-74	40-59	75-90	60-74	40-59	Pre-Dief. Pearson	Pre-Dief. Dief. Pearson
Noth. 31% in Part.	25%	23.5%	Noth. 44% in Part.	19%	12%	Noth. 29% in Part.	22% 20%
Tec. 56	75	53.0	Tech. 38	62	82	Tech. 52	67 70
Subst. 13	0	23.5	Subst. 19	19	6	Subst. 19	11 10
100% 100% 100.0%			100% 100% 100%			100% 100% 100%	
Tau-B = .12			Tau-B = .35			Tau-B = .05	
						Tau-B = .13	



of the Senate. The first two are the following:

Now about the expectations of people in the past, do you think the Senate lives up to these?<sup>3</sup>

and, after the lengthy preamble of,

For some time now various people have been dissatisfied with the Senate as a legislative body and for different reasons have recommended that the Senate be abolished or reformed. At the same time, there are others that feel that the Senate performs satisfactorily the functions of a useful complement to the Lower House and are quite satisfied to keep things as they are.

the Senators were asked,

Where do you stand in this regard?

These were asked to discern the Senators' levels of satisfaction with the Senate.

Responses to the first question were grouped under three categories: those who were satisfied that the Senate lived up to the expectations of people in the past,<sup>4</sup> those who had mixed feelings on the subject, and those who indicated that they felt the Senate did not live up to the expectations of the Founding Fathers. The responses to the second question were grouped into four categories: revisionists, qualified revisionists, qualified status

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<sup>3</sup>This was asked after the question "Would you say that this role [the role of the Senate today] is pretty well in line with the expectations for the Senate held by people in the country today?" The data from the responses to this question would have been used if it were not for the large number of Senators (56%) who stated flatly that the majority of the people have no expectations for the Senate.

<sup>4</sup>By "people in the past" I refer mainly to the Fathers of Confederation. It was not thought desirable that the Senators be induced to think along the formal lines of what was said about the Senate during the Confederation debates, so only if the Senators indicated that they did not understand what I meant by "people in the past" did I say "people like the Fathers of Confederation".





quo, and status quo.<sup>5</sup>

The responses to these two questions indicate that the Senators for the most part are satisfied with the work the Senate is doing today. In the responses to the first question it was found that only 13% felt that the Senate was not living up to expectations of the Founding Fathers, 29% had mixed feelings, and 58% were satisfied that the Senate was living up to the expectations of the Fathers. Under the second question 17% indicated that they were revisionists, 11% that they were qualified revisionists, 22% that they were qualified status quo, and 50% that they were pure status quo. This data is summarized in Table 22.

TABLE 22  
Senators' Levels of Satisfaction

Expectations (N=45)			Rev. vs. Status Quo (N=46)			
Dissat.	Mix	Sat.	Rev.	Q.Rev.	Q.Stat.	Stat.
13%	29%	58%	17%	11%	22%	50%

<sup>5</sup>The revisionists suggested constitutional changes such as changes in the appointment system, limiting Senators' terms to ten years or making the Senate elective. The qualified revisionists made such suggestions but also emphasized that caution would have to be exercised in bringing them about. The qualified status quo respondents called for relatively radical surgery but within present constitutional framework (e.g. there should be more sessions, more and better staff, or the Senate should take the initiative more often). The status quo were either completely satisfied, or had a passive attitude as indicated by their suggestions that they should be given better press, more work to do, etc.



The next two questions were asked to discern the Senators' attitudes toward changes in the type of work the Senate is doing.

The two questions were as follows:<sup>6</sup>

What things should the Senate be doing that it is not?

and

Why do you suppose that it does not perform this (these) functions?

The responses to the first question were grouped into three categories: those who made positive suggestions, those who made what we will term passive suggestions, and those who seemed satisfied that the Senate was doing as much as it is able to do.

Examples of the positive responses are:

We should take over much of the work of Royal Commissions. Our committees could be used to do more research on social, legal and constitutional problems.

or

We could be more courageous. We could challenge bills more often.

The suggestions of the "passive" group were not quite so daring.

Typical of these are:

We could probably do a little more to ease the work load of the House of Commons.

or

About all we could do is have more private bills introduced here in the Senate.

Finally, the "satisfied" Senators gave responses somewhat like this one:

We're really quite busy now. I can't think of a single thing else that we should do.

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<sup>6</sup>What was really of interest here was what the Senators felt the Senate could be doing to make its part in the legislative process more meaningful and why they felt the Senate was not doing more.





The second question i.e. Why do you suppose that it (the Senate) does not perform this (these) functions was only asked of the Senators who gave positive or passive answers to the first question. The responses again were grouped into three categories: the self-critical Senators (i.e. those who blamed the Senators for their inactivity), the complacent Senators (i.e. those that felt the Senate was hamstrung by the House of Commons and the Government), and those who had mixed feelings.

Typical of the self-critical category are:

Many of the Senators aren't interested or are too old. Others like to commute and you can't hold five directorships in Toronto, keep a prosperous law business going, and be a good Senator all at the same time.

or

The Senators don't want to go against the party in power. Party lines interfere here to the point where you can't get Senators to take the initiative.

Those with complacent orientations gave responses such as:

Ask the House. It just will not give us more to do. They dismiss us and probably don't even trust us.

or

We would do more if it became evident that certain problems should be looked into.

The distributions of the responses to the two questions may be seen in Table 23.

Again, some relations exist between the Senators' responses to the four questions above and several independent variables. Here the independent variables of interest are the Senators' areas of representation, their party affiliations, their regimes of appointment, their ages, whether or not they hold leadership positions in the Senate, and the number of directorships they hold in private firms.



TABLE 23

Senators' Attitudes to Changes in the Work the Senate is Doing

Should Do (N=49)			Why it Doesn't (N=40)		
Pos.	Pass.	Sat.	Self-Crit.	Mix	Complac.
78%	10%	12%	27%	13%	60%

Area of Representation.-- Two hypotheses seem to be worth testing in this context. First, as we have seen, the Senate was, at least ostensibly, primarily instituted for the protection of provincial and sectional interests; yet, we can hardly say that it has performed this federal-representation function. Since the beneficiaries of this protection were to have been Quebec, the Maritimes and the West it would seem reasonable to expect that the Senators from these regions, if they thought the role at all important, would show a greater amount of dissatisfaction with the Senate than would the Ontario Senators. Likewise, it would seem safe to assume that these people would be the most likely to advocate reform of the Senate so that it would be better able to perform the function for which it was originally intended.

As Table 24 shows, the data does not indicate that this assumption is valid. Surprisingly, the Senators' responses to the question on the Fathers' expectations indicate that the reverse is true.<sup>7</sup> However, the Sen-

<sup>7</sup>It should be noted here that the apparent disenchantment of the Ontario Senators, instead of taking the form of complaints about the Senate not protecting the provinces and the sections, tended to take the form of complaints about the Senate not doing enough in a general sense.





tors from Quebec and the West, when reminded of the general dissatisfaction in the country with what the Senate is doing and asked how they stand in regard to the complaints, tended almost as much as do the Ontario Senators to indicate that they were not satisfied with the Senate. At the same time, the Senators from the Maritimes tended overwhelmingly to assume the status quo position; much more so even than they do tend to indicate satisfaction with the Senate. Recalling the data in Tables 16 and 17, this is perhaps related to their relatively low tendencies to perceive the Senate as a protector of provincial and sectional interests and their generally "blurred" perceptions of the work of the Senate. In other words, perhaps we have the signs of a general apathy among the Maritime Senators.

TABLE 24

Senators' Levels of Satisfaction with the Senate as  
Related to Areas of Representation

	Area							
	Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.	Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.
Sat.	36%	50%	75%	64%	Stat. 42%	37%	18%	87%
Mix	27	37	17	36	Q.Stat. 8	37	37	13
					Q.Rev. 17	13	18	0
Dissat.	37	13	8	0	Rev. 33	13	27	0
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=11)	(N=8)	(N=12)	(N=14)	(N=12)	(N=8)	(N=11)	(N=15)
	Tau-B = .26				Tau-B = .35			



The responses to the two questions on changes in the work of the Senate seem to indicate clearly that the Maritime Senators do seem to be apathetic or complacent (See Table 25). However, the main reason why these questions were felt to be of importance was because of the general feeling among the Senators from the West that a great cause of Senate inactivity was the tendency among Central Canadian Senators to commute. The cause of disgruntlement here is the fact that while Central Canadian Senators can have the best of two worlds (i.e. watch their business interests closely and be Senators at the same time), Western Canadian Senators are compelled to either sit in Ottawa throughout Parliamentary sessions or go through the expense and bother of commuting over long distances.<sup>8</sup> The only reasonable solution so far as the Western Canadian Senators were concerned was that the Senate should be given something to do to make their stay in Ottawa worthwhile. However, they generally were pessimistic about this being brought about mainly because, as they saw it, the Central Canadian Senators would never go along with them.

The data in Table 25 show that they were wrong in their assumption that the Central Canadian Senators were happy with the present work load of the Senate. In fact, the only really significant difference between the Senators' attitudes in Ontario and Quebec, and the West is the high proportion of Senators from the West who indicate the self-critical attitude in their answers to the questions asking why the Senate is not doing more. What is

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<sup>8</sup>This is indeed a difficult choice when one considers the distances involved and the fact that the Senate usually adjourns at 5 P.M. on Thursdays leaving the Senators in Ottawa with virtually nothing to do until 8 P.M. Tuesday when the Senate usually reconvenes.







more, the level of complacency among the Quebec and Ontario Senators is considerably less than the complacency of the Senators from the Maritimes.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 25

Senators' Attitudes on Changes in the Senate's Work  
as Related to Area of Representation

Area									
	Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.		Ont.	P.Q.	West	Mar.
Posit.	85%	89%	83%	60%	Self-crit.	20%	25%	45.5%	18%
Pas.	0	11	8	20	Mix.	20	13	9.0	9
Sat.	15	0	8	20	Compl.	60	62	45.5	73
	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100.0%	100%
	(N=13)	(N=9)	(N=12)	(N=15)		(N=10)	(N=8)	(N=11)	(N=11)
	Tau-B = .20					Tau-B = .03			

Party.-- Table 26 does show us that the Conservative Senators indicate a slightly greater tendency to show dissatisfaction with the Senate. However, as we will see, responses of the Senators seem much more to be related to their ages and their regimes of appointment, so a detailed discussion of party and the attitudes does not seem necessary.

<sup>9</sup>The Maritime Senators too are faced with the same dilemma as the Western Canadian Senators are faced with, but if they were bothered about being in Ottawa without any evident legislative duties they did not convey this to the author.



Senators' Levels of Satisfaction and Attitudes Toward  
Changes in Work of the Senate in Relation  
to Party

PARTY									
Lib.		P.C.		Lib.		P.C.			
Sat.	65%	47%	Stat.	50%	21%	0%	Complac.	52%	71%
Mix.	23	35	Q.Stat.	19	7	17	Mix.	19	6
			Q.Rev.	12	11	83	Self-Crit.	29	24
Dissat.	12	18	Rev.	19	11				
100%		100%	100%		100%	100%	100%		100%
(N=26)		(N=17)	(N=26)		(N=18)	(N=29)	(N=18)	(N=21)	(N=17)
Gamma = .31			Gamma = .08			Gamma = .37		Gamma = .28	

It should be remembered throughout this analysis that this question was only asked of those who indicated "passive" or "positive" attitudes in the previous dimension. It seems safe to assume that those who were complacent in the "should do" dimension would show the same tendency in the "why doesn't" dimension.





Regime of Appointment and Age.--- The relations between the Senators' regimes of appointment and their ages, and their levels of satisfaction and their attitudes on changes in the work of the Senate are quite strong (See Tables 27 and 28). Strongest of these appears to be the relation between the Senators' regimes of appointment and the four variables. It has long been a complaint about the Senate that the Senators are for the most part too old to want to make a challenge out of their work as Senators. The equation has gone something like this: Old age equals complacency. Our data, however, indicate that not only age is a factor but also the number of years of service in the Senate. In other words, the longer the Senator has sat in the Senate the more he is likely to take on the "clubbish" spirit of the other Senators.

Leadership Positions in the Senate.--- It could be hypothesized that if a Senator held some sort of leadership position in the Senate that he would tend more to be satisfied with the work of the Senate and tend less to suggest changes. The assumption here is that the busy Senator is the happy Senator and it is the leaders who as a group are the busiest.<sup>10</sup> None of the relations, however, found between the Senators' leadership positions

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<sup>10</sup>It is worth noting in this regard that, if the Senators' perceptions of themselves as specialists are any indication of their activity, the Senators with leadership positions rate quite high. Here of the 13 leaders interviewed 85% considered themselves as specialists while only 56% of the other Senators considered themselves to be specialists (on the whole 63% of the Senators considered themselves as specialists). Leaders in this context are Senators who are party leaders or whips, or committee chairmen. The only two "leaders" to indicate the generalist orientation were the two party leaders.



# Senators' Levels of Satisfaction and Attitudes Toward Changes in the Work of the Senate in Relation to Age

$$\text{Gamma} = .25$$





# Senators' Levels of Satisfaction and Attitude Toward Changes in the Work of the Senate in Relation to Regime of Appointment

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seem strong enough for us to assume that leadership positions can be considered as a determinant of the responses independently from age and regime of appointment<sup>11</sup> (See Table 29).

Number of Directorships.-- A common complaint among the disenchanted Senators was that too many Senators held interests outside of the Senate to allow the Senate's work to be worthwhile (see example p. 57). If the diagnosis of these Senators is accurate it would be expected that the number of directorships held by Senators in private firms would be a fairly good index of their level of activity outside the Senate, perhaps a strong enough index that a relation would exist between the Senators' levels of satisfaction and complacency and the number of directorships they hold. Again, however, our data does not indicate that we can consider this variable as an independent determinant. Moderate relations do exist between the Senators' responses to the first two questions, however, considering the weakness of these relations, and the fact that the Senators from Quebec and Ontario tend more to have directorships than do Senators from the West and the Maritimes (in our sample 44%, 36%, 25%, and 20% respectively), it is more likely that the differences we do have are as much due to region of representation as to the number of directorships Senators hold (Compare Table 30 with Tables 24 and 25).

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<sup>11</sup>Gamma .430 and .489 relations exist between leadership positions, and age and regime of appointment respectively with the older Senators and those with the most service tending more to hold leadership positions.





TABLE 29

Senators' Levels of Satisfaction and Attitudes Toward  
Changes in the Work of the Senate in Relation  
to Their Leadership Positions

Leadership Positions											
Leader				Not Lead.				Not Lead.			
Leader				Not Lead.				Not Lead.			
Sat.	58%	58%	Stat.	64%	45%	Sat.	23%	8%	Complac.	74%	56%
Mix.	25	30	Q.Stat.	9	26	Pas.	15	8	Mix.	13	13
Dissat.	17	12	Q.Rev.	18	9	Posit.	62	84	Self-Crit.	13	31
			Rev.	9	20						
	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%
	(N=12)	(N=33)		(N=11)	(N=35)		(N=13)	(N=36)		(N=8)	(N=32)
	Gamma = .02			Gamma = .25			Gamma = .49			Gamma = .40	



TABLE 30

Senators' Levels of Satisfaction and Attitudes Toward  
Changes in the Work of the Senate in Relation  
to Their Number of Directorships

Firms															
No Firms				No Firms				No Firms				No Firms			
1-3				1-3				1-3				1-3			
4+				4+				4+				4+			
Sat.	64%	50%	60%	Stat.	43%	74%	75%	Sat.	9%	33%	0%	Complac.	61%	33%	75%
Mix.	33	25	40	Q.Stat.	25	13	25	Pas.	12	0	20	Mix.	14	17	0
Dissat.	3	25	40	Q.Rev.	13	13	0	Posit.	79	67	80	Self-Crit.	25	50	25
100%				100%				100%				100%			
(N=30)				(N=8)				(N=5)				(N=28)			





In this section, it was found that on the whole the Senators indicated satisfaction with the Senate as it is today. This is true of their feelings on how the Senate lives up to the expectations of the Fathers of Confederation, on the question of Senate reform, and on the question of who is to blame for the Senate not being more active. The only general dissatisfaction was indicated in the Senators' responses to the question of whether or not the Senate should be doing more. Here 88% of the Senators thought that the Senate should be given more to do. It was also found that the Senators' levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction were most strongly related to the Senators' regions of appointment, their ages, and their regimes of appointment. In the case of region of appointment the most remarkable finding was the high level of complacency among the Senators from the Maritimes, as well as the self-critical attitude of the Western Senators. As far as age and regime are concerned the younger and more recently appointed Senators indicated the highest degree of dissatisfaction while the older Senators and those who have served the longest tended to be considerably more complacent.



## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding pages our chief concern has been the manner in which Senators perceive themselves as legislators. In the second chapter an attempt was made to ascertain these perceptions by analysing data collected from the Senators' responses to questions that were used to determine their orientations in a direct way. Of primary interest here was the extent to which Senators perceived themselves as having federal-representational roles. This special emphasis was placed on the federal-representational role because of an interest on the part of this author in the validity of the hypothesis that although the Senate has done little in the area of protection of provincial and sectional interests the Senators, as representatives of their respective provinces, are just the same disposed to such a role.

This hypothesis was shown to be false by our data. However, some significant relations were shown to exist between the Senators' orientations in this regard and some independent variables. Here it was discovered that strong relations existed between the Senators' areas of representation and their perceptions of federal-representational roles, with the Senators from the West and the Maritimes indicating stronger orientations to this role. It was also found that moderate relations were found between the Senators' ages and regimes of appointment and their orientations under the purposive, representational, and party vs. province dimensions. Here we can say that under the purposive and party vs. province dimensions the younger and more





recently appointed Senators show the strongest loyalties to province in the first dimension and to party in the second. At the same time, under the representational foci dimension the older Senators and those who have served the longest tended more than the others to follow a literal interpretation of the intentions of the Founding Fathers and to indicate that they felt their focus of representation was their province of representation.

The Senators' orientations to a general legislative role were determined by more indirect means than were their orientations to a federal-representation role. Seven questions were used in this regard. One dealt with the Senate's role in general, two with the Senators' perceptions of the nature of the Senate's work, two with the Senators' levels of satisfaction with the work of the Senate, and two with their attitudes on possible changes in its work load. It was through the use of these questions that it was felt we would be able to get an understanding of the Senators' orientations to the general legislative role of the Senate.

Briefly summing up the findings, the data reveals first that with regard to the Senators' perceptions of the general role of the Senate and the nature of its work most Senators indicated what might be called the realist's perception of the Senate's role. In each case 61% of the Senators no longer considered the Senate to be fulfilling the traditional or substantive roles (i.e. protecting conservative interests, the propertied, minorities, or the provinces) and indicated that they felt the Senate's best possible channel for a meaningful role was in the area of technical review of legislation.

This consensus however on what the Senate is doing does not mean that the Senators are blind to the fact that the Senate in the eyes of many is not performing satisfactorily as a second chamber. In fact, the Senators who



showed the greatest amount of realism were also the ones to show the greatest amount of dissatisfaction with what the Senate was doing and were more willing to suggest revision of the Senate as a possible means to improving its role as a second chamber (i.e. the Senators from Ontario, Quebec, and the West, the younger Senators, and the more recently appointed Senators). Nevertheless a great complacency is evident in the Senate. This is indicated by the fact 58% of the Senators thought the Senate is living up to the expectations of the Fathers of Confederation and that 50% could think of nothing that could be improved in the Senate's constitution or internal structure to help it better fulfill the role of a second chamber in the Twentieth Century. Certainly equally disappointing is the fact that although 78% of the Senators could offer positive suggestions as to what additional work the Senate could or should be doing, only 40% indicated that they blamed the Senate, even partially, for not doing more. One gets the distinct impression from all this that complacency as a stifler of the Senators' initiative still has major proportions in the Senate. If this is the case then we can say with confidence that the Senate's inactivity is a two-way street where complacent men fail to make the best of what quite clearly is an almost impossible constitutional and political situation.

Nevertheless, the hope would be that something can be salvaged to give the Senate a meaningful part to play in the legislative system. Given the present constitutional position of the Senate, however, I would think it most unrealistic of anyone to consider any role for the Senate other than the technical role described in Chapter I.







Even if the Senate were to pursue this role more faithfully than it has it would not only require the co-operation of the Government and the House of Commons (they after all would assign the work), but it would also require a radical change in the dispositions of the Senators themselves. The Senate's image has suffered immensely from the complacency of its members over the years.

Partially to remedy this situation the Senators are now required to retire at 75. The effects of this change will not be entirely evident for a number of years. The age limit does not apply to those who were appointed prior to the rule change,<sup>1</sup> but judging from the responses of the younger and more recently appointed Senators it appears that the "clubbish" spirit of the older Senators is at long last being challenged by the restlessness of an influx of new blood never before experienced in the Senate.<sup>2</sup> All indications are that this youthful spirit will be the ultimate victor as the average age of Senators decreases year by year. What remains to be seen is whether this victory will come soon enough or be complete enough, and whether it will result in a sufficiently great change in the Senate's image to bring about an increase in public confidence in the Senate. If this change is great enough it seems safe to say that the Senate will be playing a more meaningful role in the legislative system, a role which perhaps may even overflow into the realm of substantive influence on legislation.

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<sup>1</sup>A large percentage of Senators (32% in our sample) are 75 or over.

<sup>2</sup>One young Senator told me flatly that he was so discouraged by the complacency of the older Senators that he would resign "if the Senate does not get going".



All of this, of course, is based on the premise that the expense of the Senate is worth the service of a complement to the House for technical review of legislation and in depth studies of the problems of the day. If one is satisfied with this premise then the possibility is that the Senate will be fulfilling these expectations better in a short while.

For the record however, it is this author's contention that the service is not of such a nature that it must by necessity be performed by a second chamber. Since 1947, government bills have been drafted by, or in co-operation with, the Department of Justice and not, as formerly, by the department or agency promoting the bill. MacKay ascribes to this change the fact that the number of bills amended by the Senate has declined radically.<sup>3</sup> In view of the present weakness of the committees of the House, MacKay might have added the question "How much room would be left for legitimate and worthwhile amendment of legislation along technical lines by the Senate if the committee system in the House of Commons were strengthened?" The answer, I suspect, is very little.

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<sup>3</sup>MacKay, p.88





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## APPENDIX I

### A NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERVIEWS

The data presented in Chapters I and II were taken from the responses to a number of questions asked in personal interviews with Canadian Senators in May and June of this year (1966).

The Sample.-- The main concern in selecting the sample for the interviews was that the sample be representative. Thus the random selection of subjects was modified by the fact that I controlled for two variables, the Senators' areas of representation and their years of appointment. In our sample then it was hoped that we would come as close as possible to having a proportion of Senators under the regime of appointment categories (i.e. Pre-Diefenbaker, Diefenbaker, and Pearson) equal to their proportions in the Senate as a whole.

Two samples were made. The first was made about two weeks before my arrival in Ottawa. However, between this time and my arrival two Senators passed away. This brought the total membership of the Senate from 97 to 95 and as a result it was necessary to revise my sample in the cells that were changed.

In the latter sample, there were 59 Senators. Their distribution according to the two variables may be seen in Table 31 and Table 32.

As it turned out, even with the attempt at controlling the sample, the sample did not turn out as representative as it was hoped it would. Quite clearly the Quebec Senators and the Pre-Diefenbaker Senators are under-represented while the Diefenbaker, Ontario and Maritime Senators are over-represented. Admittedly, it is unfortunate that the sample did not turn out to be more representative but under the conditions it is difficult to see how



TABLE 31

Distribution of Senators, Initial Membership,  
June 16 Membership, Original Sample, and  
Number of Completed Interviews by Re-  
gion\*

	Number of Senators May 12 +	Number of Senators June 16 ++	Original Sample (May 12)	Completed Interviews
Ontario	23 (24%)	22 (24%)	15 (25%)	13 (27%)
Quebec	22 (23%)	21 (23%)	14 (24%)	9 (18%)
Maritimes	26 (27%)	25 (28%)	17 (27%)	15 (31%)
West	24 (26%)	23 (26%)	14 (24%)	12 (25%)
Total	95 (100%)	91 (100%)	59 (100%)	49 (100%)
Vacancies	7	11		

\*Percentages in brackets.

+This is the membership after the two deaths.

++Membership after four retirements.

TABLE 32

Distribution of Senators, Initial Membership,  
June 16 Membership, Original Sample, and  
Number of Completed Interviews by Regime  
of Appointment

	Number of Senators May 12	Number of Senators June 16	Original Sample (May 12)	Completed Interviews
Pre-Dief.	45 (47%)	41 (45%)	28 (48%)	21 (43%)
Dief.	30 (32%)	30 (33%)	19 (32%)	18 (37%)
Pearson	20 (21%)	20 (22%)	12 (20%)	10 (20%)
Total	95 (100%)	91 (100%)	59 (100%)	49 (100%)
Vacancies	7	11		





it could have been improved upon. Besides the usual refusals (two) this author had to contend with two retirements and two Senators from the sample who were too ill to interview. Further, the Senate recessed unexpectedly on June 18 and was not to reconvene until June 28. This left me with four interviews that I was unable to complete, as I was unable to spend an additional two weeks in Ottawa waiting for the Senators to return.

The refusals, illnesses and retirements were unavoidable difficulties; however, the four that were missed because of the recess perhaps could have been completed if my approach had been different. One difficulty that perhaps should have been foreseen was the tendency on the part of the Quebec Senators to put off being interviewed. This difficulty was perceived at the very beginning and it is felt that it was based on language difficulties. At the time, I decided to make the best of the problem but now I realize that I should have had a bilingual interviewer available to assist me in cases where it was clear that the Quebec Senators were not too anxious to cooperate in English.

The Interview Schedule.-- The interview schedule consisted for the most part of adaptations of questions asked by Allan Kornberg in his 1962 study of the House of Commons, and questions that were developed by this author.<sup>1</sup> The questions developed by me were largely inspired by hypotheses developed after reading MacKay and Kunz on the Senate.

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<sup>1</sup>Questions 1-2, 4-13, 39, 42-64 and 67-85 may be credited to Kornberg while questions 14-36, 40-41, and 65-66 were developed by me. Question 3 was adopted from a question asked by Wahlke et al in their study of four American legislatures.



The schedule itself was pre-tested in two ways. Our primary concern in both cases was bringing it down to a reasonable length. The first tests were conducted with three professors in the Political Science Department at the University of Alberta (Professors J. King Gordon, William F. Dawson, and Frederick G. Hulmes) who were willing to assist me by playing the roles of Senators. With these interviews I was able to cull out a number of questions and reduce the length of the schedule to about one and one-half hours. Six pre-tests were made with Senators before the schedule was finalized. It was found at this stage that one and one-half hours was just slightly more time than most of the Senators seemed willing to give, so the schedule was further reduced to about one hour and ten minutes. This arrangement turned out quite satisfactorily though I found that most Senators were beginning to get impatient after about one hour of interviewing. A further advantage in this arrangement is the fact that a relatively small number of interviews (5) were interrupted. The longest interview took just over two hours while the shortest took only forty minutes.

Interview Problems--Interviews for the most part were arranged by telephone. This task was made considerably easier for me by the fact that most of the Senators had been made aware of my intentions by the help of three sponsors of my research in the Senate. These were the Progressive Conservative Senators G.S. Thorvaldson and Jacques Flynn who were kind enough to mention my research in the Progressive Conservative caucus, and the Liberal Senator Donald Smith who arranged for a circular letter to be sent to Liberal Senators explaining my study.

The language problems have already been discussed, but in addition to these I encountered the usual problems that one must expect in research of this kind. It should be pointed out that although the Senators are for the







most part not busy legislators one leaves the Senate with the impression that for the most part they are busy men. An additional difficulty that would not be found in other legislatures was the tendency of Senators, particularly from Central Canada, to commute, and hence be absent from Ottawa from Friday to late Tuesday. As a result of this practise I had found, half-way through my stay in Ottawa, that I had interviewed practically my entire quota of Senators from the Maritimes and the West, but had just begun to interview my quota from Ontario and Quebec.<sup>2</sup>

I had very good fortune so far as privacy is concerned during the interviews, especially in view of the large number of Senators who share offices. Only five interviews were carried out with people in the room other than the Senator and myself throughout the interview, and two were carried out with other people in the room intermittently. All of the interviews were carried out in the respective Senator's offices.

Interview Ratings.-- In order to keep a record of my impressions regarding the quality of each interview upon its completion, I made a few general comments which included ratings of the Senators' cooperativeness and frankness during the interviews. These ratings are highly subjective, however, they may be useful to the reader as an indication of the general quality of the interviews (See Table 33). Senators were assured of anonymity.

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<sup>2</sup>Part of this was due to mismanagement on my part, the Senate was in recess the week of May 16 when I began my interviews, and at this time the Maritime Senators and some from the West were the only ones in Ottawa.



TABLE 33

Ratings of the Senators' Cooperativeness and Frankness

	Cooperativeness	Frankness
Very Coop./Frank	31%	25%
Coop./Frank	61	53
Not very Coop./Frank	2	12
Not Coop./Evasive	6	6
Difficult to say	0	4
	100%	100%
	(N=49)	(N=49)





APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CANADIAN SENATORS

I would like to begin by asking some questions about what you as a Senator think about your work.

1. What are the most important things you want to accomplish as a Senator?
2. If for some reason you had to give up being a Senator next week, what would you miss most about your work?
3. Is there any particular subject or field of legislation in which you consider yourself particularly expert - I mean when it comes to dealing with proposed legislation in that field?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

How do you suppose you became an expert in this field of legislation?

We would like to know something about your role as a representative of your province.

4. How much do you think the people in your province know about you as a person?
5. What would you say is that most important thing the people in your province know about you?
6. Do you think that most of the time you know how the average voter in your province feels about major issues that come before Parliament?



7. How do you make sure about the accuracy of your information about the feelings of the people in your province?

8. From what sources do you think you get the most accurate information about the feelings of the people in your province?

9. Do you get much mail from the people in your province?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, how much?

10. Do the people in your province communicate with you in other ways such as personal visits or telephoning and so on? (have R. specify in which ways).

Yes ( )                      No ( )

11. Do you think that the people of your province are more interested in your position on policy matters before the Senate or in your performing such services as contacting an administrative official or securing information?

12. Some Senators feel that their primary responsibility as a representative is to their province first and then their region or to the country as a whole. Others feel differently. How do you feel about this matter?

13. If you felt that a majority of the people in your province were opposed to your party's stand on legislative issue, how would you probably vote on these issues?





We would like to have some of your views on the Senate as a Second Chamber in Canada's Parliamentary system.

14. First, with regard to initiation of legislation, would you like to see more legislation initiated in the Senate?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

15. What are the principal advantages of having legislation initiated in the Senate rather than in the House of Commons?

16. Are there any particular sorts of legislation that you feel should be initiated in the Senate?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, Why is this so?

The Senate often revises government legislation

17. Do you think that Senators often see faults in pieces of government legislation that have been overlooked by the Government and the House of Commons?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, What sort of things?

18. Would you care to name two or three things that the Senate as a legislative body can do better than the House of Commons?

19. The question of whether or not the Senate should amend financial legislation has been subject to debate since Confederation. Do you feel that the Senate should amend financial legislation?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, under what circumstances?



20. What would you say causes Senators to advocate certain types of revisions of legislation (for example, representation of interests, provinces, etc. expertise in particular types of legislation, party membership others).

21. I wonder if you could tell me of instances where you have advocated revision of a certain piece of legislation?

Legislation:

Date:

Why did you advocate revision in this (these) cases?

Now, the Senate has the power of veto over all types of legislation and has at times exercised this power.

22. Could you suggest some situations where you feel that it would be necessary for the Senate to exercise this power?

Why would this be so?

23. Would you like to see this power exercised by the Senate more often?

Yes ( )

No ( )

If Yes, are there any particular sorts of legislation over which you feel the Senate should increase its use of the power?

Why, would you say, have you chosen these?

If No, Why?

Now speaking in general terms

24. What would you say is the role of the Senate today in Canada's parliamentary system?





25. Would you say this role is pretty well in line with the expectations for the Senate held by people in the country today?

Yes ( ) No ( )

In what way would you say this is so?

26. Now about the expectations of people in the past, do you think the Senate lives up to these? (if R. asks what people say people like the Fathers of Confederation)

Yes ( ) No ( )

27. What things should the Senate be doing that it is not?

Why do you suppose that it does not perform this (these) functions?

If R. mentioned the protection of provincial rights in No. 25 say:

You mentioned earlier that you were interested in the Senate's role as a protector of provincial and sectional interest.

If R. did not mention the protection of provincial rights in No. 25 say:

We are particularly interested in the Senate's role within the federal structure of the Canadian system.

For both say:

Some people feel that within a federal structure the primary function of the Senate should be the protection of provincial interests against the federal executive and the House of Commons.

28. What is your position on such a proposed role for the Senate?



We would like to know something about the way in which Senators are appointed.

29. What do you think generally leads to the appointment of individual Senators?

30. To what factor or factors do you ascribe your appointment to the Senate?

31. Now, which if any of these do you feel you represent in the Senate? (card I)

\_\_\_\_\_ your province

\_\_\_\_\_ religious group

\_\_\_\_\_ ethnic group

\_\_\_\_\_ economic group

\_\_\_\_\_ your party

\_\_\_\_\_ a territory within your province

\_\_\_\_\_ other

32. Do you feel that third parties should be represented in the Senate?

Yes ( )

No ( )

If Yes, How should this be done?

For sometime now various people have been dissatisfied with the Senate as a legislative body and for different reasons have recommended that the Senate be abolished or reformed. At the same time, there are others that feel that the Senate performs satisfactorily the function of a useful complement to the Lower House and are quite satisfied to keep things as they are.

33. Where do you stand in this regard?





34. If revisionist,

(a) What then are the chief difficulties, so far as you are able to see, with the Senate?

(b) What sort of changes would you recommend?

If in favour of status quo,

Is there anything in your opinion that might be changed about the Senate?

35. Do you feel that a Second Chamber in a parliamentary system is in a good position to protect provincial and sectional interests?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, How?

If No, Why is it not?

36. Do you think that Senators should be

\_\_\_\_\_ elected

\_\_\_\_\_ appointed by the provincial governments

\_\_\_\_\_ appointed by the federal government

One of the things we are most interested in is your political career before you entered the Senate.

37. Had you ever held a public office before your appointment to the Senate?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

If Yes, I would like to know the offices you have held.



Office	Local	Provincial	Federal	When from.... to....
1st				
2nd				
3rd				
4th				
5th				
6th				

37(a) When, if ever, have you been an unsuccessful candidate for any office?

38. Had you ever held an office in your party?

Yes ( ) No ( )

If Yes, What and When did you hold them?

Party Office	Local	Provincial	Federal	When from.... to....
1st				
2nd				
3rd				
4th				
5th				
Present				

If not mentioned, have you ever been a delegate to annual meetings or leadership conventions of your party at the provincial or federal level?





I imagine that Senators, like other legislators, have various sources of advice and information that are particularly of use to them in making their judgments with regard to legislation.

39. Could you name two or three sources of advice and information which are particularly useful to you?
40. I have a list of things and I would like you to tell me whether or not you find them at all useful in providing you with good advice and information no matter what the legislation? (show Card II)

\_\_\_party leadership in the Senate

\_\_\_party leadership in the House of Commons

\_\_\_party leadership in the province

\_\_\_your provincial government

\_\_\_interest groups

\_\_\_local government officials

\_\_\_civil services

\_\_\_others

Now would you care to mention two of these items that are in your case particularly useful?

41. I have a list of interest groups, would you first tell me whether in your case they are at all useful and then name one or two which are particularly useful? (show Card III)

\_\_\_business groups

\_\_\_labor groups

\_\_\_agricultural groups

\_\_\_fisheries groups

\_\_\_veterans groups

\_\_\_religious groups

\_\_\_ethnic groups

\_\_\_others



42. Now, some people feel that interest groups perform useful functions in government, while some others feel that they interfere with parliamentary government. How do you feel about this?
43. How often do interest groups contact you as a Senator? Never ( ), Occasionally ( ), Frequently but not every week ( ), Often at least once a week ( ), (check)
44. How do they contact you?

As students of politics one of the things we are most interested in, is the place of parties in a legislative system.

45. How important do you think parties are in a political system?
46. Why do you think this is so?
47. How about the general situation here in Canada? Would you say we have too much party competition ( ), not enough party competition ( ), the proper amount of competition ( ).
48. Do you think the number of parties in Canada is a good thing? Why?

With regard to parties in the Senate

49. What do you feel is the role of parties in the Senate?
50. Do you feel that there are any basic differences in the role that parties should play in the House of Commons and the Senate?
- Yes ( ) No ( )
- If Yes, What are these?
51. How strong is the discipline of your party in the Senate?





52. What are the two or three most important functions of the caucus of your party in the Senate?
53. Would you say that the way a Senator votes is always:  
(1) a true indication of his policy feelings on an issue ( )  
(2) almost always a true indication ( )  
(3) seldom an indication ( )
54. (If R has been a Senator for at least two years) How often in the last two years have you abstained or voted against the majority of your party?
55. Are there any circumstances when you feel it is not necessary to vote with your party?  
  
Yes ( ) No ( )
56. If Yes, What are these?
57. What are the advantages of going along with your party?

We understand that there are often joint caucuses of party members in the House of Commons and the Senate.

58. How important would you say these joint caucuses are?
59. Would you say that they are becoming increasingly important?  
  
Yes ( ) No ( )  
  
If Yes, Why do you think this is so?
60. How often do you attend these joint caucuses?
61. In general, what kinds of things are discussed in these caucuses?
62. What are two or three of the most important functions of the joint caucuses?



Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the various jobs here in the Senate.

First of all,

63. What positions do you hold in the Senate?

64. Now, how about the committee chairmen - what role ought a committee chairman play in order to be most effective in his job?

Now getting back to parties for a moment, many Senators take an active part in such party activities as election campaigns.

65. Do you take any part at all in such activities?

Yes ( ) No ( )

If Yes, What sort of work have you done?

In what campaigns?

If No, Do you feel Senators in general ought to take part in campaigns?

66. Now, do you play any role at all in your party's organization?

Yes ( ) No ( )

If Yes, What types of things do you do?

On what level?

If No, Do you feel Senators in general ought to play some kind of role in their party's organization?

Yes ( ) No ( )

#### DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Now a few more questions about yourself and we'll be through.

67. Are there any professional, civic, fraternal or religious organizations to which you belong?





68. Are you an officer in any of these organization?

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Member</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Activity Level</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

69. What year were you born? \_\_\_\_\_

70. Where were you born? \_\_\_\_\_

71. Where did you spend most of your years that you were growing up, that is, was it in a city ( ), or town ( )?

72. Province \_\_\_\_\_

73. Have you ever lived on a farm (if not mentioned)?  
Yes ( ) No ( )

74. If Yes, Where? \_\_\_\_\_ (province)

75. Between what ages? \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

76. How many years have you lived in the Province you represent? \_\_\_\_\_

77. How much education have you had?

\_\_\_\_\_ grammar school only

\_\_\_\_\_ terminal trade school

\_\_\_\_\_ some secondary school

\_\_\_\_\_ matriculation only

\_\_\_\_\_ check if out of province

\_\_\_\_\_ check if collegiate

\_\_\_\_\_ some university

\_\_\_\_\_ university graduate (no further education)

\_\_\_\_\_ out of province

\_\_\_\_\_ out of country



\_\_\_\_\_professional school

type \_\_\_\_\_

degree \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_out of province

\_\_\_\_\_out of country

\_\_\_\_\_graduate school

field \_\_\_\_\_

degree \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_out of province

\_\_\_\_\_out of country

78. What is your religious preference?

79. How often do you attend religious services?

80. What was the original national background of your family on your fathers side? \_\_\_\_\_

mothers side? \_\_\_\_\_

81. Was your father born in Canada Yes ( ) No ( )  
your mother ..... Yes ( ) No ( )

82. Which do you consider to be your ethnic group?

83. What was your father's usual occupation while you were growing up (be specific)? \_\_\_\_\_

84. What is your own primary occupation (aside from being a Senator)? \_\_\_\_\_

85. Was this your occupation when you entered public office? Yes ( ) No ( )

If not, What? \_\_\_\_\_





Thank you for your time and cooperation:

(By observation) Sex \_\_\_\_\_

Year of appointment \_\_\_\_\_

Province \_\_\_\_\_

Party \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:





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